Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2

Article 14

Spring 2003

2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Criminal
Law
Larry D. White
Roger Williams University School of Law

Mark Ted Romley
Roger Williams University School of Law

Kyle Zambarano
Roger Wiliams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Recommended Citation
White, Larry D.; Romley, Mark Ted; and Zambarano, Kyle (2003) "2002 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Criminal Law," Roger
Williams University Law Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 2, Article 14.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol8/iss2/14

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

2003]

SURVEY SECTION

497

Criminal Law. State v.Casas, 792 A.2d 737 (R.I.2002). After a
mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy only
attaches if the prosecutor's actions were intended to provoke the
defendant to move for a mistrial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Defendant Oscar W. Casas was indicted for possession of, and
intent to deliver, cocaine.' Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion in limine to preclude the state from introducing in its case-inchief, a statement he allegedly made to a detective of the state police, that "you've been chasing me for years." 2 The trial judge reserved ruling on the motion; however, during opening statements,
the prosecutor made reference to the statement at issue by stating
that the officer had been investigating the defendant for years. 3
After an immediate objection from the defense counsel, the judge
held a hearing outside the presence of the jury, at which point defense counsel moved for mistrial based on the prosecutor's statement.4 The trial judge declared a mistrial the following morning.5
At the start of the second trial, the defendant moved to dismiss
the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 6 In a hearing on the
motion to dismiss the indictment, defense counsel admitted there
was no evidence the error was deliberate or in bad faith. 7 However, the defense argued the prosecution should have been on notice this information could be inadmissible and should not be used
until ruled upon.8 The trial judge then concluded that the actual
statement affected by the motion in limine and the opening statement were different enough from one another to be considered separate issues.9 The judge concluded, however, that the phrase
"drug trafficking" in the prosecutor's opening statement was inflammatory terminology and "fatally prejudicial" to the defendant,
warranting a mistrial, and did not have to reach the issue of notice
1. State v. Casas, 792 A.2d 737, 738 (R.I. 2002).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7.

Id.

8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 739.
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to the prosecution for the inadmissibility of the statement.' 0 In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the trial judge, during the second trial, concluded that there had been no showing that the opening statement reference was made in bad faith or deliberately, or
to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial and, therefore,
refused to dismiss the indictment at the second trial.1 1 The defendant appealed and the Rhode Island Supreme Court expedited his
appeal.12
BACKGROUND

In the past, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has normally allowed interlocutory appeals from a motion to dismiss for double
13
jeopardy claims.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court began with the general rule
that mistrials on a motion from the defendant do not normally result in double jeopardy attaching. 14 Exceptions are allowed when
prosecutorial misconduct was intended to create a situation where
the defendant would be compelled to move for a mistrial. 1 5 The
basis for this exception is to preclude prosecutors from engineering
a mistrial if a trial is "rapidly declining."1 6 In this case, because
the error occurred so early in the trial, the court held it was more
likely the result of prosecutorial inexperience rather than an attempt to create a mistrial.' 7 However, the court disagreed with
the second trial judge and stated that the deferred ruling on the
motion in limine should have put the state on notice that the information from the objectionable statement was inadmissible until
the first trial judge ruled otherwise.' 8 However, lacking evidence
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing State v. Wiggs, 635 A.2d 272, 275 (R.I. 1993); State v. Chase,
588 A.2d 120, 122 (R.I. 1991)).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing State v. McIntyre, 671 A.2d 806, 807 (R.I. 1996) (conforming to
the United States Supreme Court ruling in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667
(1982))).
16. Id. at 740.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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of intentional conduct on the part of the prosecution, the supreme
court upheld the second trial court's decision and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. 19 In its analysis, the court considered defendant's re20
quest to revisit the court's precedent established in State v. Diaz
and establish stricter constraints on prosecutors based on the state
constitution but was satisfied the present protections strike the
proper balance between a defendant's rights and societal
21
interests.
CONCLUSION

In affirming the trial court decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court leaves intact the present rule regarding double jeopardy attaching after a mistrial; defense motions to dismiss an
indictment after a defense-requested mistrial should only be
granted if the prosecution clearly intended to provoke the mistrial
through its own misconduct. In so deciding, the court will look at
both the conduct in question and where it occurred in the trial.
Larry D. White

19.
20.
21.

Id.
521 A.2d 129 (R.I. 1987).
Casas, 792 A.2d at 740 (quoting Diaz, 521 A.2d at 133).
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Criminal Law. State v. Santiago, 799 A.2d 285 (R.I. 2002). In
deciding whether a defendant has violated probation, the trial justice should not assess the defendant's guilt as to the underlying
charge. Instead, the trial justice should decide if the defendant acted with the "good behavior" required of a person on probation.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Anibal Santiago (defendant), a man serving three suspended
sentences, was pulled over by the Pawtucket police while driving
an unregistered vehicle without a valid license.' When the police
officer approached the vehicle, the defendant and a passenger began to reach under the front seat. 2 At this time the officer removed
Mr. Santiago from the vehicle while the passenger fled. 3 A later
search of the vehicle revealed two revolvers in the area where Mr.
Santiago and his passenger had been reaching. 4 Mr. Santiago was
brought to trial on charges stemming from this incident and the
state asked that he be deemed in violation of his probation.5 The
trial justice applied the correct "reasonably satisfied" standard to
the narrow question of whether or not Mr. Santiago had possession
of the gun and was thus guilty of the underlying crime. 6 Finding
that there was no "scintilla of evidence" that Mr. Santiago knew
the weapon was in the vehicle, the justice held that the defendant
was not guilty of the underlying charge and, therefore, had not violated his probation.7 The state sought, and was granted, a writ of
certiorari. 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Without deciding whether Mr. Santiago had actually violated
his probation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial
justice had made an error of law in applying the "reasonably satisfied" standard. 9 The trial justice applied the "reasonably satisfied"
standard only to the charge that was brought before him, the pos1.

State v. Santiago, 799 A.2d 285, 286 (R.I. 2002).

2.

Id. at 287.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 286.

9.

Id. at 288.
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session of guns without a permit. 10 Eschewing that view, the supreme court held that when the state seeks to have a defendant's
probation revoked, the "reasonably satisfied" standard should be
applied to the totality of the circumstances, not just the underlying
crime."' Instead of being satisfied the defendant committed the
underlying crime, the trial justice need only be satisfied the defendant did not "keep the peace" or maintain "good behavior." 12 The
supreme court then noted that facts such as driving with a suspended license, in an unregistered vehicle, with two fully loaded
firearms could support a finding that Mr. Santiago had violated his
probationary status by failing to discharge his duty of good behavior. 13 Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was quashed
14
and the case was remanded.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the "reasonably
satisfied" standard to be applied in deciding whether or not probation has been violated should include all of the circumstances surrounding a defendant's actions, not just the underlying criminal
charge. Mr. Santiago's case was remanded for the standard to be
correctly applied.
Mark Ted Romley

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Tilson, 794 A.2d 465 (R.I. 2002). In the
course of pre-trial plea negotiations, a prosecutor's threat to
recharge the defendant with greater charges should the defendant
not plead to the current lesser charges is not grounds for a finding
of vindictive prosecution, even when that threat is made immediately prior to trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The State of Rhode Island (state) alleged that Juan Tilson
threatened another with an object that appeared to be a handgun
on February 4, 1999.1 The state failed to recover a handgun in the
subsequent investigation. 2 Although the state contemplated
charging Tilson with assault with a dangerous weapon, 3 the state
initially filed a one-count information charging felony assault with
a device substantially similar in appearance to a firearm, pursuant
4
to section 11-5-2.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
The public defender represented Tilson in all plea negotiations.5 After refusing Tilson's offer to plead to lesser charges, the
state informed Tilson, on the day of trial, that if he pled guilty to
the felony charged, it would then recommend Tilson serve no jail
time. 6 The state also advised Tilson, should he not accept the plea
offer, it intended to dismiss the case, and then recharge him with a
two-count information adding a count of assault with a dangerous
7
weapon.
Upon Tilson's rejection of the offer, the state, as promised, successfully moved for dismissal of the case and filed the two-count
information against Tilson.8 Subsequently, a superior court trial
justice granted Tilson's motion to dismiss, arguing that his due
process rights were violated by "prosecutorial vindictiveness" because of the close proximity of the threat to the beginning of the
trial. 9 In doing so, the justice also noted that the dismissal and
subsequent recharge would create an undue financial burden on
1. State v. Tilson, 794 A.2d 465, 466 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 469.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 466.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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Tilson, if he had retained private council.' 0 The state appealed to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court."
ANALYsis AND HOLDING

Two standards exist to prove vindictive prosecution: (1) actual
vindictiveness and (2) circumstances warranting a presumption of
vindictiveness. 12 Three federal precedents support a finding that
the facts herein do not rise to the level of either of those two
13
standards.
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,' 4 a defendant's due process rights
were not violated when a prosecutor followed through on a threat
to reindict the defendant on more serious charges if the defendant
fails to plead guilty to the lesser charges.' 5 Although this
prosecutorial conduct aims to convince the defendant to waive his
constitutional right to a trial by jury, it does not suffice as vindictiveness because "the 'give and take' of plea bargaining" leaves the
ultimate decision, however unenviable, in the hands of the defendant. 16 Unless the prosecutor does not have probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime described by statute, or
the prosecution's selection is based on an unjustifiable standard,
7
such as race, the state can exercise discretion in prosecution.'
In United States v. Goodwin,18 the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the holding of Bordenkircher, and additionally
cautioned against "adopting an inflexible presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting." 19
20 the First Circuit
In United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo,
held that the government's decision to seek the enhancement of
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 467 (citing United States v. Marrapese, 826 F.2d 145, 147 (1st Cir.

1987)).
13. Id.
14. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
15. Tilson, 794 A.2d. at 467 (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358).
16.

Id. at 468 (quoting Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 363).

17. Id. (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364).
18. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
19. Tilson, 794 A.2d at 468 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381).
20. 70 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1995). This case did note "such cliff-hanging practices are not wise." Tilson, 794 A.2d at 468 (citing Cartagena-Carrasquillo,70
F.3d at 715).
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penalties the day before jury selection did not support a finding of
21
vindictive prosecution.
Based upon the fact that the state both contemplated the
greater charge initially and made the ramifications of the refusal
of the plea offer clear to Tilson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the prosecution's conduct did not support a finding of vindictive prosecution. 22 Furthermore, the court noted that herein,
Tilson was defended by the public defender, rather than private
counsel as hypothesized by the trial justice. 2 3
CONCLUSION

In State v. Tilson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed
the superior court's finding that a prosecutor's threat to file greater
charges should a defendant not plead guilty to the lesser charges
did constitute vindictive prosecution. Based upon both
Bordenkircherand Goodwin, such a threat does not support a finding of either actual vindictiveness or circumstances warranting a
presumption of vindictiveness. Furthermore, Cartagena-Carrasquillo allows for the prosecution to make such threats immediately
preceding trial. In contrast, the state's initial contemplation of the
greater charge and the clear statement of the ramifications should
a defendant fail to accept the plea offer, together indicate a lack of
vindictive prosecution.
Kyle Zambarano

21. Tilson, 794 A.2d at 468 (citing Cartagena-Carrasquillo,70 F.3d at 715).
22. Id. at 469.
23. Id.

